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The Role of the Holder in Due Course
Doctrine in Consumer Credit Transactions
By DAVID J. BENSON* and ALPHONSE M. SQUILLANTEI*

IT has been said that the law is like "a single-bed blanket on a double
bed and three folks in the bed and a cold night. There ain't ever
enough blanket to cover the case, no matter how much pulling and
hauling, and somebody is always going to nigh catch pneumonia." 1
Perhaps nowhere in the law is that metaphor more apropos than with
respect to the law concerning the holder in due course doctrine as it
is applied in consumer credit transactions.
In the typical case, a consumer purchases a product from a seller
who has the consumer execute a promissory note payable to the seller
in the amount of the unpaid purchase price of the product plus interest
and any other carrying charges. The seller then either fails to deliver
the product, or the product which is delivered is defective or otherwise
fails to meet the consumer's expectations.
The consumer then seeks rectification of the shortcoming in the
seller's performance and, when such action is not forthcoming, stops
making payments on the promissory note which he executed at the time
of the purchase. It is usually at this stage that the consumer realizes
that his promissory note has been negotiated to someone to whom the
law refers as a "holder in due course" and that, according to the law,
the consumer must continue making the payments on the note notwithstanding the fact that the product is defective or has not been delivered
to him.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern
University. J.D., 1970, Syracuse University. Member, New York Bar.
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In response to the consumer's allegation that such a rule of law
is patently unfair, the holder in due course (which is likely to be a finance company or a bank) points out that if it were not accorded
holder in due course status it would not purchase promissory notes from
the seller. If the seller could not sell promissory notes received in payment for his goods, the seller would not take the consumer's promissory
note because the seller lacks the resources to finance his own sales;
and if the seller would not take the consumer's promissory note, the
consumer would ,be unable to make the purchase until he had saved
sufficient cash or had made arrangements -to obtain credit from another
source. Thus, on a theoretical plane at least, if too much protection
is given to the consumer the financer may be unwilling to finance, the
seller unable to sell, and the consumer unable to buy. On the other
hand, the protection traditionally given the financer by the holder in
due course doctrine has resulted in consumers having to pay for goods
which are defective or never received.
This article examines the role played by the holder in due course
doctrine in the tripartite relationship of consumer, seller and financer.
The article first reviews recent challenges to the doctrine as manifested
in legislative proposals and judicially imposed limitations. It then analyzes the failure of these efforts to produce uniformity in the treatment
of holders of commercial paper arising from consumer credit transactions, and concludes with an assessment of what is needed to achieve
such consistency in the future.
The Holder In Due Course Doctrine
The holder in due course doctrine is not new. The concept was
recognized in England as early as 1758 in Miller v. Race, 2 and in the
United States as early as 1842 in Swift v. Tyson.' Indeed, part of the
criticism which might be made of the holder in due course doctrine is
that it was born in a period of history in which methods of transportation and communication were still quite primitive. Because of the slow
methods of transportation and communication, it was perhaps necessary
to afford a high degree of protection to remote holders of commercial
paper, since it was impossible for such holders to make quick checks
2. 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758), in which Lord Mansfield held that it was necessary for commerce to protect the "currency" of bank notes by insulating a bona fide
purchaser of a stolen bearer bank note from a claim of ownership by the true owner
of the note.
3. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See also Coolidge v. Payson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.)
66 (1817).
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of the circumstances giving rise to the issuance of commercial paper
before purchasing that paper. With the advent of "instant" communication, however, it might be argued that the purchaser of commercial
paper can immediately ascertain whether the maker has any defense
to the instrument prior to acquiring it and that there no longer is a need
for the holder in due course doctrine.
The doctrine in any event remained relatively unassailed from the
time of its inception sometime in the mid-eighteenth century until the
latter half of the twentieth century. It was not until the 1960's that
the first major assault was mounted by critics of the concept. This assault was launched in the area of consumer credit transactions and was
manifested in a spate of legal articles,4 court decisions, 5 and legislative

activity. 6
With a doctrine of such long standing coming under attack by critics from all quarters, it is not surprising that the holder in due course
doctrine was identified as another "citadel" presumably destined to go
the way of the requirement of privity in products liability law.7 It does
4. See, e.g., Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer-Credit
Problems, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 409 (1967); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445 (1968); McEwen, Economic Issues in State Regulation of Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 387
(1967); Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable
Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Ouso ST. L.J. 667 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Murphy]; Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM.
L. REv. 375 (1971); Note, Consumer Financing,Negotiable Instruments, and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the Judicial Dilemma, 55 CoRNELL L. Rav. 611
(1970); Note, Negotiable Instruments: Consumer Versus Financierin Consumer Goods
Financing-A Judicial Dilemma. 52 MARQ. L. REV. 285 (1968); Comment, Translating
Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 395 (1966); Comment, Consumer Protection-TheRole of Cut-Off Devices in
Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 505 (1968); Note, A Case Study of the Impact
of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period,
78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Case Study].
5. See, e.g., Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969);
Unico v. Owen, 50 NJ. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); American Plan Corp. v. Woods,
16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968). See notes 76-115 & accompanying text
infra.
6. See notes 16-75 & accompanying text infra.
7. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 667, wherein the analogy is drawn between the
recent attacks upon the holder in due course doctrine and those made upon the requirement of privity of contract in products liability cases. The attack on the privity doctrine
was of course the subject of the late William Prosser's famous articles: Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MIN. L. REV.
791 (1966). Prosser in turn derived his theme from Justice Cardozo's famous statement: "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

not seem coincidental that the assault on the holder in due course doctrine in the consumer credit context roughly parallels the development
in the United States of "consumerism." Indeed, the calling into question of the holder in due course doctrine as it relates to consumer credit
transactions seems an integral part of the consumer movement in the
United States.
The aspect of the holder in due course doctrine which has been
questioned is -that which results in the consumer-the maker of the
note-being precluded from asserting many of the defenses which
would otherwise be available -to a buyer of goods or services. The facet
of the doctrine which insulates such a holder from claims by other persons of ownership of the note is generally regarded as insignificant in
the consumer credit situation, as most notes are given directly to the
financer by the seller and seldom become lost or stolen. 8
The cutting off of defenses, however, is deemed significant in the
consumer credit situation. It is currently effectuated through section
3-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which provides that
a holder in due course takes such an instrument free from all defenses
of any party to the instrument except for those which are generally
deemed "real" defenses. 9 The real defense of greatest importance in
the consumer credit situation would seem to be that of fraud in the facturn, or what the UCC describes as "such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential
terms ... "
The real defenses available to the maker of a promissory note
8.
(1971).
9.

See Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 378
Uniform Commercial Code [UCC] section 3-305 provides:

To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument
free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt except

(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders
the obligation of the party a nullity; and

(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument
with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its
character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and

(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the
instrument.
10. UCC § 3-305(2)(c).
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against a financer who is a holder in due course would appear to be
applicable in a fairly limited class of cases. For the most part those
cases would involve the more blatant forms of consumer fraud, as
where the consumer is tricked into signing a negotiable instrument under the belief that he was signing something else. 1 The defenses
which the consumer cannot assert against the financer, on the other
hand, would seem to include those which are more likely to apply in
the typical consumer sales situation. Thus, in a suit brought by a financer who is a holder in due course, the consumer does not have available those defenses which are generally termed "personal" in nature.
One such personal defense is want or failure of consideration. 2
This situation is likely to arise where the seller is to provide goods or
services in the future and fails -to perform. Such a seller at the time
performance is due may be insolvent, absent from the jurisdiction, or
otherwise unable or unwilling to deliver the goods or perform the contract as promised. Nonetheless, .the consumer must continue to pay the
financer or risk being sued for the unpaid balance, interest and usually
costs of collection, including attorney's fees.
Equally unavailable to the consumer is the defense of breach of
warranty.'
Thus, where the goods delivered by the seller fail to conform to either express or implied warranties, the buyer must continue
to pay the financer on the note.
The consumer is also precluded from asserting the defense of nondelivery or delivery for a special purpose.'
For example, the buyer
might enter into an agreement with the seller whereby the buyer can
return the goods to the seller if the buyer is not satisfied. If the consumer also signs a promissory note which is negotiated to a holder m
due course the note must be paid by the consumer, notwithstanding the
fact that he wants to return the goods or has already done so.
The consumer is also prevented from asserting the defense that,
although he knew he was signing a promissory note, he was fradulently induced to enter into the transaction. 5 Thus, where a homeowner is told that a swimming pool company wants to build a swimming
11. United States v. Castillo, 120 F. Supp. 522 (D.N.M. 1954); see UCC § 3305 (2) (c).
12. Goetz v. Bank of Kansas City, 119 U.S. 551, 556 (1887); see 'UCC § 3-306
(c).
13. See, e.g., Deavenport v. Green River Deposit Bank, 138 Ky. 352, 128 S.W. 88
(1910); UCC § 3-306(b).
14. See, e.g., Quebec Bank v. Hellman, 110 U.S. 178 (1884); UCC § 3-306(c).
15. Stevens v. Pearson, 138 Minn. 72, 163 N.W. 769 (1917); see UCC § 3-306
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pool for him for advertising purposes, and that the promissory note is
simply evidence of the homeowner's good faith and will be destroyed
or returned to him after the pool is shown to a number of prospective
customers, the homeowner is still liable on the note to the financer.
The foregoing examples of the operation of the holder in due
course doctrine in consumer credit transactions are not intended to be
exhaustive, nor are they intended to present all of the equities of the
seller, the financer or the consumer. They are merely intended to exemplify the types of situations which the authors believe have given
rise to the attacks on the holder in due course doctrine in consumer
credit transactions. An analysis of those challenges follows.
Challenges to the Holder In Due Course Doctrine
National Commission on Consumer Finance
While the passage in 1968 of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act 6 (which includes what is more commonly referred to as
the "Truth in Lending" Act) did not affect the application of the holder
in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions, it did create the
National Commission on Consumer Finance (NCCF) .1 This commission was charged with the responsibility of studying and appraising the
consumer finance industry.
The final report of the NCCF was issued in December 1972.11
Part of that document was concerned with remedies available to creditors engaged in the business of consumer finance. The NCCF sought
to discover which remedies were essential to the credit industry in collecting consumer loans and which were not. In pursuit of that information, the NCCF conducted a survey of creditors engaged in the purchase of promissory notes executed in connection with consumer credit
transactions. One of the members of the commission has indicated that
of the banks surveyed, only 8 percent considered the holder in due
course doctrine to be of prime importance in effecting collection of consumer paper; 19 of the finance companies responding, none suggested
that the holder in due course doctrine was essential to the collection
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-44, 1661-65, 1671-77, 1681-81t (1970), as
amended (Supp. II, 1972); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601, Commentary (1970).
18. Consumer Credit in the United States: Report of the National Commission
on Consumer Finance (1972) [hereinafter cited as Consumer Credit Report].
19. Johnson, Creditors' Remedies and Rate Ceilings: Some Study Results of the
National Commission on Consumer Finance, 26 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 64, 65

(1972).
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of consumer loans.2" Both banks and finance companies did indicate,
however, that the holder in due course doctrine was relied upon by
them in legal actions to collect loans in default.
In addition to surveying consumer credit financers, the NCCF
studied a number of states which had abolished or limited the holder
in due course doctrine in order to ascertain the effect of such abolition
or limitation on creditors, sellers and consumers.2 " The NCCF project
showed that:
1. [C]onsumer finance companies purchased less . . . consumer
goods paper; and...
2. [T]he total amount of . . . consumer
goods credit made
22
available in the retail market declined.
From the study the NCCF concluded that abolishing or limiting the
holder in due course doctrine "would have the greatest impact on consumers who are marginal credit risks and on those businesses which
serve . . such consumers. 1 3 The commission noted that as a result
of the reduction in consumer goods credit caused by the abolition or
limitation of the holder in due course doctrine, many businesses dealing
mainly with high risk customers would probably be forced out of business. The high risk consumer would consequently find it more difficult
to find credit or, if credit was found, would be faced with higher finance
charges to offset the risk involved.24
Having surveyed the banks and finance companies regarding their
attitudes toward the holder in due course doctrine and having analyzed
the effects of abolition or limitation of the holder in due course doctrine
in certain states, the NCCF recommended that the doctrine be abolished with respect to consumer finance. The report concluded:
Notes executed in connection with consumer credit transactions
should not be "negotiable instruments"; that is, any holder of such
a note should be subject to all the claims and defenses of the maker
(the consumer-debtor). However, the holder's liability should not
exceed the original amount financed. Each such note should be
required to have the25legend "Consumer Note-Not Negotiable"
printed on its face.
The commission felt that although the abolition of the holder in due
course doctrine in consumer transactions might result in high risk con20. Id.
21. The states involved were California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York and Vermont. Consumer CreditReport, supra note 18, at 1, 23.
22. Id. at 36.
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. let. gt 35,
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sumers finding it difficult to obtain credit, such consequences would be
offset by the general improvement of the quality of goods and services
provided to all consumers.26 This latter change would result from dealers being forced to improve or to risk losing the market for their commercial paper.
The NCCF recognized that in such a scheme the financer would
bear much of the responsibility for policing the practices of sellers; it
concluded, however, that financers were in a much better position than
consumers to monitor a dealer's performance since, if a dealer has too
many customer complaints or has a reputation for sharp business practices, the financer can simply refuse to purchase more of that dealer's
paper.2 7 The consumer, on the other hand, usually learns of the sharp
practices too late to protect himself and does little to warn other potential buyers.
Merely abolishing the holder in due course doctrine in consumer
credit transactions in order to achieve the goal of preserving the consumer's defenses assumes that the seller in the tripartite relationship
will be the one who extends credit to -the consumer and then negotiates
the promissory note to the financer. If, however, the consumer applies
directly to a financer, perhaps at the suggestion of the seller, and obtains a loan with which he makes the purchase from the seller, the abolition of the holder in due course doctrine will have no effect on the
duty of the consumer to repay the loan which he obtained directly from
the financer. It is no defense to -the financer's action on the consumer's
debt that what the consumer purchased with the proceeds of the loan
was worthless.
Aware of this obvious device for avoiding the effect of the abolition of the doctrine, the NCCF also recommended that the use of the
so-called "direct loan" be limited in consumer credit transactions. The
commission did not suggest that all direct loans to consumers be abolished or limited, but did recommend that where the financer is closely
identified or connected with the seller, the consumer's defenses on the
sales contract should be preserved in any action by the financer on the
direct loan used to purchase those goods.2 8 This limitation would appear to prohibit the seller from forming a separate finance company to
engage in direct loaning to consumers. It would also appear to preclude any arrangement whereby all of a seller's customers would be re26.

Id. at 36-37.

27.
28.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 37-38.
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ferred to a specific financer, especially where the seller received a commission for such references.
The report indicated that, in recommending the abolition of the
holder in due course doctrine and the limiting of direct loans in consumer credit transactions, the commission had to weigh the needs of
small businessmen to secure capital to enter and remain in markets
serving consumers or marginal credit risks against the need to protect
consumers in general. The NCCF had no doubt about which way that
balance should tip, concluding that "[tihe inevitable reduction in availability of consumer credit in some markets will be more than offset by
'2 9
increased consumer confidence in the market as a whole.
The NCCF study represented the first comprehensive examination of the whole field of consumer finance in the United States. Although the report was technically made to Congress and contained over
forty recommendations requiring federal action, it contained another
sixty recommendations requiring state proceedings. 0
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code

By the mid-1960's, the growing challenge to the holder in due
course doctrine had taken form in a number of state legislative enactments which abolished or limited the doctrine in a variety of consumer
credit transactions. 31 Commentators of the time noted that the challenge, which had been manifested in the enactment of a wide variety
of state statutes, was unsatisfactory and poorly organized.3" It became
apparent that if the ad hoe erosion of the doctrine continued state by
state, the result would be an endless array of conflicting and confusing
statutory schemes, a result equally intolerable to consumers, sellers and
financers. With the various state approaches to consumer credit problems already having resulted in a lack of uniformity, and the prospect
of a consistent approach to -the problems being bleak, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws quite appropriately
undertook the formulation of a uniform law concerning consumer
credit.
The result of the commissioners' work was the promulgation in
1968 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC). While the
29. Id. at 38.
30. Miller & Warren, A Report on the Revision of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 27 OKLA. L. R y. 1, 3 (1974).
31. See Wilier, Need for Preservation of Buyers' Defenses--State Statutes Reviewed, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 132, 133 (1972).
32. See, e.g., Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer-Credit
Problems, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rnv. 409 (1967).
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UCCC deals with a number of consumer credit problems, one of the
major changes it effected was the abrogation of the holder in due course
doctrine. This was accomplished in the following provision:
In a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or
lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, the seller or lessor may
not take a negotiable instrument other than a check as evidence
of the obligation of the buyer or lessee. A holder is not in good
faith if he takes -a negotiable instrument with notice that it is issued
in violation of this section . . . 3
In order to ensure that the consumer's claims and defenses, preserved by the elimination of the holder in due course doctrine, would
not be circumvented by -the seller's use of contracts containing a provision whereby the consumer waives his defenses against any assignee
of the sales contract, the UCCC provided two alternatives for state
adoption. Alternative A made such waiver-of-defense clauses unenforceable but limited the liability of the assignee to the amount due
on the contract.3 4 Alternative B gave effect to the waiver-of-defense
clause if the consumer had not notified the holder of any defense within
ninety days.3"
The UCCC did not, however, limit loans made directly to the consumer by a financer. This factor has been viewed as an important
loophole and has been one of the major criticisms of the act.36 Such
criticism would seem well founded. The UCCC has also been challenged on the ground that someone acquiring the paper without notice
that it was given in a consumer credit transaction can still be a holder
in due course, thereby cutting off the consumer's defenses.3 7 The validity of this criticism is somewhat doubtful; it would seem easy for
courts to entertain the presumption that someone who takes an instrument drawn by an individual in favor of a retail establishment has notice
that it was given in violation of the UCCC. In addition, the UCCC
made the acceptance of such paper by the seller a misdemeanor,3" a
33.
34.
35.

UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE [UCCC]

§ 2.403.

Id. § 2.404 (Alternative A).
Id. § 2.404 (Alternative B).

36. Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New
UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 272, 292 (1969).
37. Id. at 288.
38. UCCC section 5.302 provides in part:
A person is guilty of a [misdemeanor] and upon conviction may be sentenced
to pay a fine not exceeding $5,000, or to imprisonment not exceeding one year, or
both, if he willfully and knowingly
(3) . . . fails to comply with any requirement of the provisions of this Act
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factor which should tend to discourage businesses from accepting such
paper as a regular course of conduct.
The UCCC has not only been criticized by those who feel -that
it does not go far enough in its protection of the consumer. Ever present is the seemingly endless debate between consumer advocates and
financers as to the need and desirability of retaining the holder in due
course doctrine in consumer transactions. Further, criticism of the
UCCC has not been limited to the provisions affecting the holder in
due course doctrine or to the provisions affecting waiver-of-defense
clauses, but has also extended to other provisions of the act. 9 As a
result of the controversy which has raged over the desirability of adopting the UCCC, only seven states have enacted it,1 0 and two other states
have substantially followed the UCCC in drafting their own consumer
credit acts. 41 However, only four states adopted verbatim UCCC section 2.403, abrogating the holder in due course. 42
In view of the almost universal adoption of the UCC,43 the lack
of acceptance of the UCCC must have been a disappointment to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In recognition of the failure of the UCCC, the conference appointed a special
committee to review that code. 4" Not surprisingly, the special committee reached the conclusion that the UCCC was no longer generally acceptable to state legislatures. 45 As a result of that conclusion, the committee developed several redrafts of the UCCC which were recently
39. See, e.g., Cohen, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code-A Design for Disaster, 23 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 10 (1968); Note, Utah's UCCC: Boon, Boondoggle, or Just Plain Doggle, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 133.
40. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-1-101 to -9-103 (Perm. Supp. 1971) (enacted 1971); IDAbo CODE H§ 28-31-101 to -39-108 (Supp. 1973) (enacted 1971); IND.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-4.5-1-101 to -6-203 (1971) (enacted 1971); IAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a1-101 to -9-102 (Supp. 1973) (enacted 1973); OXLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to
9-103 (1972) (enacted 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-1-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1973)
(enacted 1969); Wyo. STAT. H9 40-1-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1973) (enacted 1971).
41. IowA CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (Iowa Legislative Service, 1974 sess., at 750);
MAINE CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, codified in ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 1.1016.415 (Supp. 1974-75).
42. See IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-4.5-2-403 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §
2-403 (1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-2-403 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. § 40-2-403
(Supp.1973).
43. Louisiana is the only state which has not adopted the UCC.
44. Alfred A. Buerger, Chairman; Walter D. Malcolm, Vice Chairman; Frederick
H. Miller, Co-Reporter-Draftsman; William D. Warren, Co-Reporter-Draftsman; Robert
W. Johnson, Reporter-Economist. UCCC Working Redraft No. 6, CCH INSTALLMENT
CREDiT GUIDE No. 299, Aug. 1, 1974, at vi.
45. Buerger, CurrentReport on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 27 PERSONAL
FINANCE L.Q. REP. 121 (1973).
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finalized in Working Redraft No. 6 and submitted to the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws.

46

Although the redrafts were primarily concerned with changes in
sections of the UCCC which did not concern the holder in due course
doctrine, Working Redraft No. 6 continues and strengthens the prohibition on the use of negotiable instruments in consumer credit transactions. 47 That redraft also contains an attempt to plug the direct-loan
loophole, which was the subject of much criticism of the original UCCC.
The Working Redraft No. 6 provision causes the direct-loan financer
to be subject to the consumer's claims and defenses arising out of the
purchase of consumer goods where -the financer and the seller have a
close relationship and where the financer is closely connected with the
seller with regard to the transaction in question. 48 Working Redraft
No. 6 also strengthens Alternative A and eliminates Alternative B with
49
respect to the waiver-of-defense clause.
The changes which were made in the UCCC in Working Redraft
No. 6 should eliminate much of the criticism of the UCCC by consumer advocates and, thus, should result in the adoption of that code
by a number of states which would not otherwise have been so disposed. It might also be argued, however, that those changes will
strengthen opposition to the UCCC by groups representing financers
and sellers. It therefore seems doubtful that there will be a rush to
adopt the UCCC as amended by final Working Redraft No. 6.
The National Consumer Act
In response to the failure of the UCCC to gain acceptance and
the criticism of those who felt that it did not go far enough in protecting
consumers, the National Consumer Law Center5 ° drafted the National
Consumer Act (NCA).51 The NCA is generally viewed as more consumer oriented than the UCCC, " 2 and the provisions of the NCA af-

fecting the holder in due course doctrine differ from those of the
46.
No. 299,
47.
48.
49.

See UCCC Working Redraft No. 6, CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUiDE
Aug. 1, 1974.
Id. at xv; see id. § 3.307.
Id. at xv-xvi; see id. § 3.405.
Id. at xv; see id. § 3.404.

50.

National Consumer Law Center, Inc., One Court Street, Boston, Ma. 02108

(1973 address).
51. NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr [NCA] (1970) (drafted by the National Consumer Law Center pursuant to an OEO grant).
52. See, e.g., Stengel, Should States Adopt the Uniform Consumer Credit Code?,
60 Ky. L.J. 8, 44-45 (1971).
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UCCC. Specifically, the NCA provides that one who holds a note arising from a consumer credit transaction cannot be a holder in due
course notwithstanding such person's lack of notice that the note came
from a consumer transaction.5 3 Under the UCCC a person can be a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument arising from a consumer
goods transaction if he takes the instrument without notice of its ori4
gin.
One critic of the NCA has written that the act proceeds on the
theory that the consumer and the financer are mortal enemies, 55 and that
"[i]n [the National Consumer Law Center's] zeal to 'protect' the consumer the net result of their effort would be. . . to destroy the availability of credit from legal sources to many consumers and to raise its
costs for most all consumers."5
Since the promulgation of the NCA
in 1971, Wisconsin has been the only state which has relied on it to
57
a substantial extent in drafting its own consumer credit statute.
Model Consumer Credit Act
In response to the criticism leveled against the National Consumer
Act and its general lack of acceptance, the National Consumer Law
Center drafted the Model Consumer Credit Act (MCCA) ,5 which is
a revision of the National Consumer Act.
With respect to the holder in due course doctrine, this revised act
differs from the NCA in that the blanket prohibition against a holder
in due course of consumer credit paper found in the NCA has been
limited in the MCCA:
(3) The lender or transferee of the lender has no liability ...
if
(a) with respect to the lender who acts in good faith he establishes by a preponderance of -the evidence that he did not
know and had no reason to know that the proceeds of the
loan, or any part of them, would be used in a consumer transaction .... r9
Thus the MCCA would abrogate the holder in due course doctrine for
both direct and indirect consumer loans where either the lender or a
53. NCA § 2.405.
54. UCCC § 2.403.
55. Moo, New Consumer Credit Legislation: Which Approach-The UCCC or
the N.C.A.?, 2 URBAN LAw. 439, 458 (1970).
56. Id.
57. Consumer Credit Transactions, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101-427.105 (1974)
(enacted 1972). Wisconsin also used the UCCC as a model for parts of its act.
58. MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr [MCCA] (1973).
59. MCCA § 2.603(3).
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transferee of the lender knew or had reason to know that the loan was
a consumer loan. The act spells out a number of situations where the
lender will be presumed to know that the note arose from a consumer
transaction. 6
Most of those situations evidence some continuing relationship between the seller and the lender, such as where the lender
provides the forms for the notes, the seller is given a commission for
financing the deal through the particular lender, or the lender makes
the payment of the loan proceeds directly to the seller.
The MCCA also differs from the NCA in that the newer act differentiates between those lenders who take the paper in good faith and
those who do not with respect to the scope of their liability. The
NCA provides that the lender is liable to the consumer for the consumer's claims arising out of the transaction up to the total amount the
consumer has to pay in the entire transaction, even though that liability
might exceed the amount that the lender loaned to the consumer.61
The MCCA, however, limits the liability of a lender who takes the
paper in good faith, without notice of any claims or defenses, to the
amount of the loan used in the purchase, plus finance charges.62 This
limitation does not apply to a lender who takes the paper with notice
of the consumer's claims or defenses.6 3
Drafted in 1973, the MCCA has not yet been adopted by any state
legislature.
Proposed Federal Trade Commission Regulation

In 1971, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposed a regulation designed to end the use of the holder in due course doctrine to
cut off consumers' claims and defenses in retail installment sales. The
proposed regulation provided:
If any contract, for the sale or lease of consumer goods or services
. . . requires or involves the execution of a promissory note or
other instrument of indebtedness, it constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice for any such retail seller to:
(a) Fail to have inscribed upon the face of such note [a notice
that the holder of the instrument takes subject to any defenses or claims by the purchaser against
64 the seller notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary].
The proposal was met with a good deal of criticism, some of which
came from consumer advocates who feared that the rule would super60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

MCCA § 2.603(4)(a-k).
NCA §§ 2.405(2), 2.406.
MCCA § 2.603(2).
Compare MCCA § 2.603(1), with id. § 2.603(2).
Proposed F.T.C. Reg. § 433.1, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971).
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sede more favorable existing or pending state legislation. As a result
of the challenges from consumer advocates, the finance industry, and
retail merchants, -the FTC ultimately withdrew the proposed regulation. 65
Part of the criticism came from the National Retail Merchants Association, which argued that the abolition of the holder in due course
doctrine would result in less credit or higher rates or both. Reference
was made to the NCCF report which concluded that where the doctrine
had been abolished, there was likely to be a reduction of credit to high
risk consumers, resulting in some small retail merchants serving those
consumers going out of business. 6 The association also contended that
the proposed rule was unnecessarily harsh inasmuch as it attempted to
make the retailer the policeman of arrangements between financial institutions such as banks and consumers, and that 'the regulation would
have the effect of superseding all state legislation concerning the holder
in due course doctrine, which the retail merchants felt the FTC could
87
not and should not do.
The proposed FTC regulation also received criticism from the National Consumer Finance Association in a report prepared by a subcommittee of its law committee."8 The report took the position that although some action concerning the holder in due course doctrine wag.
necessary, the proposed FTC regulation was unacceptable. The report
concluded by noting that if some new legislation had to be adopted,
the UCCC best strikes the balance between safeguarding the consumer
and protecting the financer's right to ensure payment of consumer
loans. 69

Perhaps one of the reasons that the proposed FTC regulation met
with such opposition was the fact that, unlike other suggested consumer
credit reform measures, it would result in the interjection of a federal
regulatory agency into the traditional tripartite consumer credit transaction, with all the attendant enforcement proceedings, burdensome reporting procedures and the like. With such opposition it is unlikely
65. See Consumer Credit Report, supra note 18, at 35.
66. Consumer CreditReport, supra note 18, at 36, cited in Rosen, ProposedTrade
Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers' Claims & Defenses, 27 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 40, 41 (1973). Rosen drafted the National Retail Merchants
Association's comments to the FTC on the proposed regulation.
67. See Rosen, Proposed Trade Regulation Rule ConcerningPreservation of Consumers' Claims & Defenses, 27 PERSONAL FIN. L.Q. REP. 40, 40-41 (1973).
68. Hendrix, Law Committee Report on Creditors' Remedies, 27 PERSONAL FiNANCE L.Q. REP. 74 (1973).
69. Id. at 77-78.
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that the FTC will attempt -to revive the proposed regulation unless state
efforts to deal with the problem continue to fall short of supplying a
consistent and uniform solution. It remains possible, however, that
some other federal agency or Congress might choose to take action affecting the holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions.
Miscellaneous State Statutes
As indicated above, the UCCC has been adopted in one form or
another in seven states,70 and substantially followed in two others.'
The National Consumer Act has been relied upon, together with the
UCCC, in one state.7 2 In the remaining forty-two American jurisdictions,73 there is either no statutory limitation on the holder in due
course doctrine or there is one or more of a hodgepodge of statutory
restrictions which almost defies classification. 74 Suffice it to say that
these limitations range from sweeping abolition of the holder in due
course doctrine to elimination of the doctrine in specific consumer
transactions such as home improvements, motor vehicles or home solicitations; to abolition of the principle in consumer transactions involving
goods worth less than a specified dollar amount; to postponement of
the doctrine for five, thirty, forty-five, sixty or ninety days after the
goods are delivered or after the financer notifies the consumer that the
consumer's promissory note has been negotiated to that financer in order to afford the consumer an opportunity to assert his defenses within
those times. 0
It is difficult to conceive of an area of the law in which the rights
of individuals vary so dramatically from state to state as do the rights
of consumers, sellers and financers involved in consumer credit transacactions. Multistate sellers and financers in particular must experience a
sense of bewilderment with the seemingly infinite variety of regulations
with which they are confronted. The need for uniform state legislation
being self-evident, one must wonder why attempts to move the states
to adopt uniform laws have failed so dismally and with such regularity.
Some of the causes of this failure have been suggested in the foregoing
70. See note 36 supra.
71. See note 41 supra.
72. See note 57 supra.
73. Including the District of Colombia and Puerto Rico.
74. For an excellent attempt to classify the state statutes, see Willier, Need for
Preservation of Buyers' Defenses-State Statutes Reviewed, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 132, 133
(1972).
75. Id.
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discussions concerning the UCCC, the National Consumer Act and the
Model Consumer Credit Act; those and other reasons are discussed
further below.
Decisional Developments
The Close ConnectednessDoctrine
Early Challenges
The initial judicial challenge to 'the holder in due course doctrine
in consumer credit transactions came long before the primary legislative
activity. In 1940, in Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs7 6 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas startled the commercial community by holding that
a finance company was not a holder in due course of a promissory note
negotiated to it by the seller of an automobile.
The defendant purchaser of the automobile claimed that the vehicle was defective and that he had been fraudulently induced to sign
the contract which contained the promissory note in question. In determining that the finance company was not a holder in due course of the
note and was therefore subject to the defendant's personal defenses,
the court noted that the promissory note contained a printed assignment
to the finance company; the forms executed by the defendant were furnished to the seller by the finance company; and the assignment took
place on the same day that the note was executed. These factors, held
the court, all indicated that the finance company was "so closely connected with the entire transaction or with the deal that it can not be
heard to say that it, in good faith, was an innocent purchaser of -the
instrument for value before maturity." 7 This close connection between the seller and ,the finance company, reasoned the court, was
-tantamount to the financer's being a party to the transaction from its
inception and, thus, it was not eligible for holder in due course status.
Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, while setting forth a novel approach to the problems generated by the traditional role played by the
holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions, had little
immediate impact outside of Arkansas. It was not until ten years later
that a court in another jurisdiction, California, adopted what came to
be called the "close connectedness" doctrine enunciated in Childs.
That court, in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine
Works,78 applied the holding of Childs to a commercial credit transac76. 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
77. Id. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262.
78. 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
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tion rather than a consumer transaction. The case involved the purchase of a mechanical press wherein a contract and note executed by
,the defendant were assigned to Commercial Credit. The lower court
held that Commercial Credit was not a holder in due course of the note.
In affirming, the California Supreme Court noted that the finance company had supplied the seller with forms and had twice consulted by
telephone with the seller regarding the impending transaction. Further, the court found that the finance company had approved the details
of the transaction and had advanced money to the seller with the understanding that the contract and note would be assigned to it upon completion of the sale. The court ruled that the finance company "was
a moving force in the transaction from its very inception, and acted as
a party to it."' 79 It therefore denied holder in due course status to the
finance company and allowed the consumer's defense of failure of consideration.
In 1953, Childs and Orange County Machine Works provided the
Supreme Court of Florida with the rationale for denying holder in due
course status to a finance company in Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin.80
In applying the close connectedness doctrine of Childs and Orange
County Machine Works, the Florida court noted that, in the sale of the
food freezer and meat saw to the consumer, the finance company had
prepared and furnished to the seller printed forms for the conditional
sales agreement with a promissory note attached. The printed forms
designated the finance company as the assignee of both the conditional
sales contract and note. The court further noted that the contract and
note stated that payment was to be made at the finance company's office, that the finance company had approved the terms of the purchase
upon investigation of the buyer's credit standing, and that the company
had taken assignment of both the contract and the note the day after
their execution.
The court was aware that its decision might place a burden on finance companies, 'but stated: "We believe the finance company is better able to bear the risk of the dealer's insolvency than the buyer and
in a far better position to protect his interests against unscrupulous and
insolvent dealers."8 1
Thus, by 1953, only Arkansas, California and Florida had used
the close connectedness concept to alter the traditional role played by
the holder in due course doctrine in credit transactions. During this
79. Id. at 771, 214 P.2d at 822.
80. 63 So. 2d 649 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1953).
81. Id. at 653.
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period, some courts considered close connectedness and rejected it;82
and at least one court felt that if the holder in due course doctrine were
to be abrogated, it was up to the legislature to do so.83 In 1954, in
a decision which seemed to mark the end of the growth of the close
connectedness doctrine, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin emphatically
rejected the close connectedness doctrine on facts similar to those in
Childs.
In Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger 4 the note in question was
on a form supplied to the dealer by the finance company and contained
a printed assignment of the note to the company. The note and an accompanying sales contract were assigned to the financer on the same
day that they were signed by the customer. The court held that the
relationship of the dealer and the finance company was not so close
as to justify treating the finance company as a party to the sales transaction. The court expressly rejected the reasoning of Childs and Mutual
Finance,stating:
We can perceive of no reason based upon either logic or public policy why a finance company or bank which supplies such blank
printed forms should be held thereby to have constituted the dealers their agents, or should be deemed to have participated in the
sale by the dealer to the customer, including the execution of any
contract, mortgage, or note which the customer may have executed
to the dealer.8 5
Following Implement Credit, judicial activity with regard to limitor
altering the holder in due course doctrine came to a virtual halt.
ing
This period of inactivity continued relatively uninterrupted until 1967,
with only an occasional decision adding other states to the list of those
rejecting the close connectedness concept,8 6 and an occasional lower
87
court decision embracing the doctrine.
Unico v. Owen
In 1967 the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the close con82.

See, e.g., Wilson v. Gorden, 91 A.2d 329 (Mun. Ct App. D.C. 1952).

Other

courts refused to find close-connectedness between a seller and a finance company on
the facts of the particular case. See, e.g., Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc. v. Mathewson, 335
Mich. 270, 55 N.W.2d 826 (1952); Miller v. Ramsey, 234 Mo. App. 983, 136 S.W.2d

138 (1940).
83. White System, Inc. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
84. 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954).
85. Id. at 162, 66 N.W.2d at 666.
86. See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d
847 (1964).
87. See, e.g., Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809
(1962).
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nectedness doctrine in Unico v. Owen.8 8 The decision was heralded
as an important assault on the holder in due course doctrine, 89 and is
now recognized as the leading close connectedness case.90
Unico involved a sales contract whereby the consumer agreed to
buy 140 stereo record albums which were to be delivered in a period
of over five years. Payments on the note were to be completed in
thirty-six months. In addition to receiving the record albums, the buyer
was to receive a new stereo record player at no charge. All the customer actually got under the agreement were the initial 12 albums and
the record player. He continued paying on the note for twelve months
until he realized that the records would not be forthcoming, at which
time he ceased making payments. Unico sued the customer for the
amount due on the $819.72 time balance plus penalties and a 20 percent attorney's fee.
In applying the close connectedness doctrine, the court focused on
the "hyper-executory character of the performance, agreed to by Universal [the seller]," 9 1 and held:
For purposes of consumer goods transactions, we hold that
where the seller's performance is executory in character and when
it appears from the totality of the arrangements between dealer
and financer that the financer has had a substantial voice in setting
standards for the underlying transaction, or has approved the standards established by the dealer, and has agreed to take all or a predetermined or substantial quantity of the negotiable paper which
is backed by such standards, the financer should be considered a
and therefore not entitled to
participant in the original transaction
92
holder in due course status.
In addition to the court's apparent limitation of its holding to cases
where the seller's performance is highly executory, the court restricted
its holding to the defense of failure of consideration, stating:
We reserve specifically the question whether, when the buyer's
claim is breach of warranty as distinguished from failure of consideration, the seller's default93as to the former may be raised as a defense against the financer.
It is somewhat odd that Unico v. Owen has come to be recognized
as the leading case adopting the close connectedness doctrine inasmuch
as the doctrine was enunciated in Childs twenty-seven years earlier in
50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 4.
90. See, e.g., J. WHm & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 479 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
91. 50 N.J. at 107, 232 A.2d at 408.
88.
89.

92.
93.

Id. at 122, 232 A.2d at 417.
Id. at 123, 232 A.2d at 417,
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a fact situation much less compelling than in Unico. Childs had suggested that the close connection could be found in the mere fact that
the promissory note was on a form provided by the finance company
and contained a printed endorsement to the finance company. 9 4 In
Unico ,the nexus between the seller and the finance company involved
much more than the mere providing of printed forms containing an endorsement to the finance company. While Unico did involve a printed
promissory note which contained an endorsement of the note to the finance company, it was also shown that Unico, the finance company, was
a partnership formed for the express purpose of financing the sales of
Universal Stereo. Further, Unico was given extensive rights of control
over the business operation of Universal Stereo.
One factor which may have contributed to the recognition of Unico
as the leading case on the close connectedness doctrine is the fact that
the decision was rendered by the highest court in a densely populated,
highly industrialized and business-oriented state. Another consideration might be the timing of the decision: Unico came 'at a time when
consumer advocates were becoming increasingly restive with the holder
in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions. The various
states' efforts to abrogate or limit the doctrine had already been
deemed inconsistent and unsatisfactory. In addition, it had been fourteen years since the highest court of any state had adopted the close
connectedness principle. 5 Also, perhaps part of the reason Unico took
on importance was the fact that Unico came from "the people who
brought you Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc."'9 6 In view of the
tremendous impact which Henningsen had on the privity of contract
requirement in products liability cases, it is not surprising that Unico
was seen by some as another Henningsen.
The nature of the sales contract makes Unico a less clear application of the close conneotedness doctrine than it would otherwise be.
However, the fact that the court stressed the nature of the consumer's
defense, the emphasis on the highly executory nature of the seller's
performance, and the limitation of the holding to the defense of failure
of consideration are suggestive more of a desire by the court to narrow
the immediate impact of the decision than they are of any meaningful
legal or logical distinctions. Why should the rule be different in the
94. See notes 76-77 & accompanying text supra.
95. The Supreme Court of Florida had adopted the doctrine in 1953. See Mutual
Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1953). See notes 80-81 & accompanying text supra.
96. WHrn & SUMMERS, supra note 90, at 479, referring to Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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situation where the product crumbles into dust after being delivered
than in the situation where that product was never delivered at all?
And should the buyer who was fraudulently induced to make purchase
be subject to less protection than a person to whom the product was
never delivered? Beyond those possible exceptions to the application
of the close connectedness doctrine, Unico contained little in the way
of legal theory which could be called unique or innovative.
After Unico v. Owen
The development of Unico as the leading case espousing the close
connectedness doctrine would be much easier to understand if it had
been followed by a -rash of cases throwing aside the holder in due
course doctrine in favor of the hapless consumer. However, unlike the
period following Henningsen, the judicial activity since Unico has been
relatively limited, and the characterization of Unico as "seminal" by
some observers9 7 seems somewhat misleading.
In the seven years since Unico, courts in only three states have
followed that decision. In American Plan Corp. v. Woods,9 8 an Ohio
appeals court applied the close connectedness doctrine where the financer had investigated the practices of the seller, had supplied the
seller with notes and other forms, had investigated the credit of each
purchaser, and had reserved the right under its agreement with the
seller to reject any note which it deemed to be risky.
In Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams9 9 a District of Columbia court
utilized -the close connectedness concept where a number of customers
were defrauded through a "referral plan" involving the purchase of
television sets. Upon discovery that the television sets were defective,
the buyers defaulted in their payments and the finance company filed
suit. The court refused to recognize the finance company as a holder
in due course because it had prearranged finance charges, approved
of the "referral plan," and also approved each customer. The court
noted that without such ratification, "even a customer who had signed
a sales contract was unable to get a television from [the seller]. The
jury could properly have concluded that appellant was so intimately involved in every step of the sales process that [the seller] was, in fact,
appellant's agent." 10 0
97. Id. at 479-80.
98. 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
99. 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. App. 1968).
100. Id. at 496.
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In Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp.,L01 the Supreme Court of
Delaware found close connectedness where the seller and financer
were both wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent corporation.
The financer was called a "finance department" of the parent corporation and had the same officers and directors as did the parent. The
parent corporation also controlled the directors and officers of the
seller. The financer further had the power to impose conditions upon
any particular transaction entered into by the seller. The court stated:
Under the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we hold
that the rule of balance should be adopted and applied; that it
should operate in favor of the installment buyer for the reason that,
in our opinion, [the financer] was so involved in the transaction
02
that it may not be treated as a subsequent purchaser for value.'

In the same seven years since Unico, courts in Connecticut and
considered the close connectedness doctrine and rejected
Wisconsin
10 3
it.

It would seem, therefore, that the most that can be said of Unico

is that it may have raised the number of jurisdictions which have abrogated the holder in due course doctrine through the application of the
close connectedness principle from scarcely a handful of states to a
handful of states.
OtherJudicialChallenges
Using what might be described as a variation on the close connectedness theme, some courts have held that a financer who is the endorsee of the note and the assignee of the sales contract, and who is
familiar with the terms of the sales contract, takes the note subject to
the terms and conditions of the sales contract executed in conjunction
with the note.' 0 4 This, of course, is an application of the "contemporaneously executed documents" rule and is addressed to the requirements that the instrument, in order to be negotiable, must contain an
unconditional promise and that in order to be a holder in due course
one must take the instrument without notice of claims or defenses.
Most cases using the contemporaneously executed documents rule
were decided prior to the enactment of the UCC. The court in Unico
relied on the rule to some extent and noted that, even though the
101. 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969).
102. Id. at 743.
103. Waterbury Savings Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 620, 238 A.2d 446,
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1049 (1967); Milwaukee Acceptance Corp. v. Dore, 43 Wis. 2d
412, 168 N.W.2d 594 (1969).
104. See, e.g., International Finance Co. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172
(1965); Local Acceptance Co. v. Kinkade, 361 S.W.2d 830 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1962).
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events in Unico occurred prior to the effective date of the UCC in New
Jersey, section 3-119 of the UCC was consistent with the court's application of the rule to preclude the finance company from being a holder
in due course. 1°5
It can be argued, however, that section 3-119 read with other sections of the code does not operate to change the traditional protection
given to the financer as a holder in due course without a showing that,
at the time of the purchase of the paper, the financer had notice of
the particular provision of the sales contract and knew that the customer
had a claim pursuant to that provision. Section 3-119(1) provides:
As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any transferee
the terms of an instrument may be modified or affected by another
written agreement executed as part of the written agreement executed as part of the same transaction, except that a holder in due
course is not affected by any limitation of his rights arising out of
the separate written agreement10 6if he had no notice of the limitation
when he took the instrument.
About this provision, the drafters stated that
a purchaser of the instrument may become a holder in due course
although he takes it with knowledge that it was accompanied by
of any defense or claim
a separate agreement, if he has no notice
07
arisingfrom the terms of the agreement.
It would seem from that section and comment that, even though
the financer knew of a provision in the contract whereby the seller
guaranteed some particular aspect of the goods, unless the financer had
knowledge of a claim at the -time the paper was negotiated he would
not be bound by that provision. This interpretation of section 3-119
(1) is supported by section 3-304(4), which provides in part:
Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice of a defense or claim
(b) that [the instrument] was issued or negotiated in return for
an executory promise or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has notice that a defense or claim
has arisen from the terms thereof. ....
The comment to section 3-304(4)(b) indicates that the section should
be read together with section 3-119 and that "[i]f the purchaser has
notice of any default in the promise or agreement which gives rise to
a defense or claim against the instrument, he is on notice to the same
extent as in the case of any other information as to the existence of
.08

105.

50 N.J. at 122, 232 A.2d at 416-17.

106. UCC § 3-119(1).
107.
108.

Id. § 3-119, Comment 4 (emphasis added).
Id. § 3-304(4) (emphasis added).
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a defense or claim."'10 9 Thus, the validity of those cases which hold
that the financer takes subject to the terms of the sales contract, simply
by virtue of being familiar with or being the assignee of the contract
is open to serious question.
Another way some courts have avoided the consequences of ithe
holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions is to find
that a financer who is familiar with the unscrupulous business practices
of a particular seller is not a holder in due course of that seller's paper
because such a holder lacks the required good faith. Thus, in Financial
Credit Corp. v. Williams,"1 0 the financer was denied holder in due course
status as the seller's bad business reputation was known to the financer,
the note was one of a package deal involving 480 similar notes, and the
notes were purchased at an 80 percent discount.
A Pennsylvania court in Norman v. World Wide Distributors"1
seemed to go even farther in holding that where the financer has a suspicion about the seller's practices, there is a duty to inquire into those
practices. In Norman, the finance company was alleged -to have been
aware of the seller's sales -techniques and frequent name changes. The
finance company was also allowed to purchase the paper at large discount rates. The court stated that "where circumstances are such as
to justify the conclusion that the failure to make inquiry arose from a
suspicion that inquiry would disclose a vice or defect in the title, the
person is not a holder in due course.""'
The Supreme Court of Illinois took a novel approach to denying
holder in due course status to a -finance company in Household Finance
Corp. v. Mowdy." 3 Mowdy involved a note accompanied by a sales
contract. The contract failed -toconform to an Illinois statutory requirement that such documents contain the following notice which had to
be in at least ten-point bold type:
NOTICE TO BUYER
You have the right to give the assignee named (or if no assignee
is named, to give the seller) written notice of any defense or right
of action which you may have against the seller within 5 days of
delivery of the merchandise described herein. If a notice is not
109. Id. § 3-304, Comment 9.
110. 246 Md.575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967).
111. 202 Pa.Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963). See also Stroudsburg Security Trust
Co. Case, 145 Pa. Super. 44, 48-50, 20 A.2d 890, 892 (1941).
112. 202 Pa. Super. at 58, 195 A.2d at 118.
App. 3d 822, 300 N.E.2d 863 (1973).
113. 13 Ill.
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received within that time, you114
may not assert such defense or right
of action against the assignee.
Although the statute did not govern promissory notes, the court held
that the failure of the contract to comply with the statute not only nullified that document but also made it impossible for anyone to be a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument arising out of such a
transaction, even though the fact of noncompliance was not evident
from an examination of the note.
It has been noted that a common theme of all decisions denying
holder in due course status to financers is that the financer is a finance
company and not a bank." 5 Perhaps the most logical explanation of
this phenomenon is that banks are careful to purchase paper only from
dealers who have good business reputations and who have a proven record of satisfactorily answering customer complaints. There might also
be a greater likelihood that a larger lending institution would take a
loss or seek redress from the dealer where it is obvious that the consumer has really been taken and that to pursue the consumer will result
in a loss of good will. Another reason why finance companies are
involved is that in several of the cases the finance company was created
to service the particular dealer. With a bank, such a situation would be
extremely unlikely. Whatever the explanation, the absence of litigation
involving banks suggests that the financer does have a strong potential
for controlling the business practices of retail merchants.
Assessing the impact of the judicial challenges on the holder in
due course doctrines is not an easy task. While it is one thing to count
up the states whose courts have limited the holder in due course doctrine, it is quite another to determine the extent to which financers in
states whose courts have not limited the holder in due course doctrine
have been influenced by cases like Unico in selecting reputable dealers
from whom to purchase consumer notes. What would seem clear from
the judicial challenge to the holder in due course doctrine is that if the
doctrine is to be generally limited in consumer credit transactions, it
is unlikely that such a broad change will be effected by the courts.
Thirty-four years after Childs, one still finds that the close connectedness doctrine has been adopted by courts in only a handful of states
and the number of states in which courts have found some other basis
for limiting the holder in due course doctrine is likewise limited in number.
114. Consumer Fraud & Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. REv.
1/2, § 262D (1967).
115. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 90, at 483.

STAT.

ch. 121-
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The Failure of the Challenges
Whether the challenges to the holder in due course doctrine are
viewed by one in favor of retaining the doctrine or by one bent on its
abolition, both would agree that the challenges have been unsuccessful.
The real failure is not in the inability to achieve abolition of the holder
in due course doctrine, but in generating a lack of uniformity which
is perhaps unequalled in American jurisprudence. As a result of the
challenges, rather than being faced with a fairly universal, clear-cut, although arguably unjust, rule-the holder in due course doctrine-one
is now faced with a hodgepodge of state statutes, a variety of decisional
approaches, and number of proposed "uniform" acts and redrafts of acts
all purporting -to deal effectively with the problem of balancing consumer protection with commercial protection. Why have the challenges to the doctrine resulted in such a situation and why has the uniformity called for by the problem been so elusive?
It is perhaps obvious that the primary reason for the failure of the
challenges is that there has been and continues to be fundamental disagreement over the basic proposition that the holder in due course doctrine should be changed. Undoubtedly the fundamental disagreement
concerning the desirability of retaining the holder in due course doctrine is due in part to, or is at least aggravated by, the lack of empirical
data on which to base any sort of a meaningful judgment.
This dearth of empirical evidence would seem to have affected
the question in two significant ways. First, although no one would
question that -the purchase of paper arising from consumer goods transactions is a multibillion dollar business, no systematic attempt has been
made to determine the actual extent to which the holder in due course
doctrine works injustice upon consumers. 16 There is no data indicating what proportion of the millions of consumers making payments on
promissory notes which have been negotiated to banks or finance companies are being forced to pay for products which were never delivered,
were not in compliance with warranties, or were sold to the consumer
through the use of fraudulent business practices. While it is tempting
to make statistical projections based upon reading the close connectedness cases that suggest that consumers are being "reamed, steamed and
116. The former national director of the OEO legal services offices has reported
that he sent questionnaires to 267 projects and received 103 responses, of which 59 were
deemed to be sufficiently detailed to be meaningful. Those reports indicated that in the
59 projects over 14,000 cases were handled in which the holder in due course doctrine
played a significant role. Speaker, Holder in Due Course-Burden of the Poor, 5
U.C.C.L.J. 146 (1972).
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dry cleaned" 117 with great regularity, without the availability of accurate
statistics it is impossible to deal meaningfully with the contention that
the number of cases in which the holder in due course doctrine works
injustice to the consumer is so small -that the benefits to be gained from
the elimination of the doctrine will be more than outweighed by the
detriments.
Second, in order to weigh the benefits to be derived from eliminating the holder in due course doctrine against the detriments, one must
also know what those disadvantages are. While there is more empirical
data regarding the detriments to be suffered than the benefits to be
derived, even that data would seem insufficient to provide a reliable
basis in deciding whether to retain or abolish the doctrine.
The evidence which is available has resulted from studies which
have sought to measure the impact of certain laws limiting or abolishing
the holder in due course status. One such work"18 surveyed the effects
of provisions of the Connecticut Home Solicitation Sales Act of 1967,
which provided that the obligation to pay arising from a home solicitation sale could not be evidenced by a negotiable instrument." 9 With
regard to the impact on financers and dealers, the Connecticut study
indicated that "[t]he clearest consequence of the Act has been a
marked reduction in institutional financing of business engaged in door
to door sales.' 120 In addition to the financers' buying less home solicitation consumer paper, the report noted that -the financers had increasingly resorted to agreements with the dealers whereby the dealers
agreed to repurchase the paper from the financer if the consumer refused to pay.12 ' Such agreements give the financers a status similar
to a holder in due course but with ,the financer running the risk that
the dealer will become insolvent.
While the study did reveal that no bank or finance company surveyed had raised its interest rates on home solicitation loans or increased its reserve account for such dealers, 22 over one-third of the
thirty-two dealers who had received "incentive payments" prior to the
act for every transaction financed through the bank or finance company
117. WHrrn & SuMMERS, supra note 90, at 483.
118. Case Study, supra note 4, at 618.
119. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-136 (Supp. 1974). However, the section provides that a promissory note which is negotiable on its face in violation of the statute
may be enforced by a holder in due course. Id. § 42-136(d).
120.
121.

Case Study, supra note 4, at 637.
Id. at 640.

122.

Id.
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no longer receive them.1 23 The study also showed that more than 50
percent of dealers indicated that it was more difficult to obtain financing, and some had even gone out of business. 12 4 With the dealers losing the incentive payments, finding it harder to find a market for their
paper and getting paid less for that paper, they experienced higher
costs; and these costs, the study noted, were probably passed on to the
25
consumer.1
While the Connecticut study made no attempt to ascertain how
many consumers had been directly helped by being able to assert defenses which would otherwise have been cut off, it did observe that the
act had the beneficial impact of causing the financers to make more
extensive investigations of the dealers whose paper they purchased. 26
This increased investigation resulted in the elimination of many of the
fraudulent dealers who were unable to obtain financing. 2 7 Another
important result of the act was the increased use of direct loans between
the financers and consumers to avoid the impact of the act. 28 This
aspect of the study would seem to have particular relevancy to any legislative proposal which does not address the direct loan problem.
While immensely valuable because of the scarcity of such research,
the Connecticut study as a whole would seem to be of limited
value in resolving the broad question of whether the holder in due
course doctrine should be abolished in all consumer goods sales. The
nature of the Connecticut act necessarily limits the applicability of conclusions which can be drawn from the report. The act applied only
to a limited category of consumer transactions, a group arguably including many of the dealers most likely 'to be guilty of consumer fraud and
shoddy workmanship. The act also made no attempt to regulate direct
loans, a factor which might have had a significant effect on the impact
of the act. Thus, while the Connecticut research suggests some of
the ramifications of eliminating the holder in due course doctrine on
a limited basis, it would seem that state legislatures should have more
empirical data than that generated by that study before being asked
to eliminate the holder in due course doctrine in all consumer credit
transactions.
Another study was carried out with the purpose of determining
the effect of the enactment of the UCCC on the credit industry of
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 643.
Id. at 643-44.
Id. at 653-54.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 642.
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Utah." 9 That work, like the Connecticut study, made no findings concerning the number of consumers who directly benefited from the act
by being able to assert defenses which otherwise would have been cut
off. The Utah study likewise involved an enactment which did not purport to limit direct loans. The Utah act did, however, apply to a broad
range of consumer transactions, and the findings made in the Utah
study supported many of the conclusions drawn by the Connecticut report.
Thus the Utah researchers noted that where increased costs were
encountered by dealers as a result of the UCCC, those costs were
passed on to the consumer. 3 ' The study also noted that the impact
of the UCCC had not been as great as feared by the financers, but attributed this factor to the lack of knowledge by the consumers of their
3
rights, especially among low income consumers.' '
While the Utah study involved an act which was much broader
than the Connecticut law, the fact that the Utah UCCC did not limit
direct loans and the sparseness of the empirical data generated by the
Utah work would suggest that something more is needed in the way
of a comprehensive, systematic analysis of the problems created by the
elimination of the holder in due course doctrine before legislators can
be expected to take a definitive position for or against abolition.
The scarcity of empirical evidence in the area has not, however,
precluded critics of the holder in due course doctrine from alleging
that the finance companies should bear the risk of loss in consumer
credit transactions because they have the financial ability to withstand
such losses, they are in the business of credit, and they can protect themselves through reserve funds,'
repurchase agreements and high discount rates. Nor has the sparsity of such data prevented those critics
from asserting that the finance companies should bear the risk of loss
because they are better able to investigate and control the practices
of dealers.' 3 3
While all such criticism may prove to be valid, it is nevertheless
important to ascertain how many consumers such critics are seeking to
protect and at what cost to consumers at large. Before state legislators
129. Note, Utah's UCCC: Boon, Boondoggle, or Just Plain Doggle, 1972 UTAH L.
REv. 133.
130. Id. at 134.

131. Id. at 144.
132. See, e.g., Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole
in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 272, 284 (1969).
133. See, e.g., Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445, 47273 (1968).
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can intelligently decide whether to abolish the holder in due course
doctrine, it would seem that the cost to be borne by all consumers
should be ascertained. Perhaps of equal importance to the lack of empirical data is the fact that the debate has been basically a political one
with strong special interest groups representing retailers, finance companies and banks on the one hand, and sometimes strong, sometimes
not so strong special interest groups representing consumers on the
other hand. It can hardly be doubted that much of the lack of uniformity in the state enactments concerning consumer credit has been
due to the shifting balance of power of these interest groups from state
to state.
In such a context, it might be questioned whether additional empirical data will really affect whether a particular state limits or abolishes the holder in due course doctrine. It would seem clear, however,
that if the evidence generated by further studies demonstrates that the
doctrine can be eliminated with a minimal impact on sellers and financers and a slight increase in the cost of credit spread over all consumers,
the polarity of the positions previously taken might be mitigated to the
point where some form of uniform legislation would become mutually
acceptable and thus be assured of passage. Of course, further empirical data might have the effect of perpetuating the lack of uniformity
if that data turns out to be ambiguous or shows that the cost to the consumers, sellers or financers may be too high to elicit their support of
any proposed legislation or changes in existing laws.
Conclusion: The Future of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine
Regardless of one's attitude toward the holder in due course doctrine as a general proposition, the present fragmented, inconsistent and
confusing treatment of that doctrine in consumer credit transactions
should not be long tolerated. It is apparent from the little empirical
data currently available that the holder in due course doctrine cannot
be abolished without cost to someone, and that someone is most likely
the consumer. If -thatcost does not place an undue burden on the consumer, the holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions should be abolished. Its elimination would not only achieve a
much-needed uniformity, but would bring the rule of law into conformity with what -the reasonable American citizen would expect it to
be.
It is in the area of uniform legislation proposed for adoption by
the states that the greatest potential lies for achieving the goal of uni-
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form treatment of the holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit
transactions. From the past judicial challenges to the holder in due
course doctrine, it appears doubtful that courts will provide the moving
force in achieving some level of consistency and uniformity of treatment
of the doctrine. The number of jurisdictions that have judicially limited the doctrine is not substantial, and their approaches have varied.
Indeed, further judicial challenges might well result in a greater degree
of confusion and fragmentation than has been witnessed thus far. New
judicial holdings based on a wide range of variable degrees of close
connectedness or good faith might work against the achievement of a
well-reasoned, uniform approach to the problem.
With the promulgation of the final redraft of the UCCC and the
promulgation of the National Consumer Act and the Model Consumer
Credit Act, it has become apparent that a greater consensus is developing among the proponents of the abolition of the holder in due course
doctrine. This consensus centers on the elimination of the doctrine in
practically all consumer credit transactions, the limitation of liability of
the financer -tothe amount financed or still due on the loan, and some
control over direct loans. Of the legislation proposed, it appears that
some form of the UCCC as amended in the sixth redraft will be the
most likely vehicle for achieving the uniformity and consistency called
for by the present state of affairs. While the Model Consumer Credit
Act differs little from the sixth redraft of the UCCC in treatment of
the holder in due course problem, -the fact that the latter was proposed
by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws may carry
more weight with state legislatures.
Even with a greater level of unity and strength among the supporters of such legislation, it is forseeable that the sixth and final redraft
of the UCCC will encounter opposition from financers, retail merchants
and consumer advocates sufficient to block its passage in many states.
Without being fully apprised of the consequences of abolition of the
doctrine, these groups will continue to refrain from giving their vital
support to any uniform legislation.
Thus, the achievement of success in attaining uniform treatment
of the holder in due course doctrine seems dependent upon the availability of new empirical data, showing that the doctrine can be abolished and that direct loans can to some extent be limited to a cost which
the financer, seller and consumer can each live with. If such evidence
is not forthcoming, it would seem that the present state of affairs will
continue relatively unchanged until popular feeling runs so high as to
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motivate Congress or some agency of the federal government to take
action, a possibility which no one concerned with the problem views
with much favor. Nonetheless, the perpetuation of the present patchwork pattern of state statutes is an equally unsatisfactory prospect.
With empirical data available, legislators will be able to assess meaningfully the impact of eliminating the holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions. A realistic appraisal of the costs of such
abolition will provide a sound basis for decision and should ultimately
pave the way for the needed uniformity.

